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| Beating the drums for justice: Calls for Bush's impeachment for 9–11
By Joyce Lynn
Online Journal Contributing Writer
http://www.onlinejournal.com/Special_Reports/Lynn012303/lynn012303.html
January 23, 2003—The "I" word in connection with 9–11 has come out of the closet as activists and citizens call for impeachment of the Bush administration.
A delegation of about 30 people on January 15 visited the office of Palo Alto Congresswoman Anna Eshoo (D-Ca) urging her to introduce articles of impeachment against George W. Bush for his "crimes of 9–11."
"The administration is lying to the American people and trying to cover-up the truth about 9–11," said organizer Carol Brouillet, a member of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.
With local television cameras rolling, a staffer to Rep. Eshoo said she would relay the group's concerns.
At a community meeting on 9–11 the following night, Brouillet urged attendees to launch similar visits to their members of Congress.
Referring to the sign popular at peace marches, Brouillet asserted, "Regime change begins at home."
One participant likened post 9–11 fears of questioning the administration's story and the lockstep response to Bush's patriotic fever to the Germans' response to Hitler. "The German people were trained for over 100 years to be free from personal responsibility. They could feel free as long as they were obeying their leader. I see a lot of that obedience in Americans," she said.
Another questioned whether an administration that was illegally installed could be impeached.
The march came a year after Brouillet led a delegation to the San Francisco office Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein demanding a congressional investigation of 9–11.
At that time, the group raised questions about the business relationships of the Bush and bin Laden families through the Carlyle Group, the failure of fighter jets to intercept the four hijacked planes in violation of standard procedures, and questions about U.S. oil interests in the Caspian Sea Basin.
With pressure from 9–11 families and over administration objections, a joint House-Senate Committee was set up to investigate the intelligence communities and 9–11. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney urged then Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) to limit the inquiries.
Because of the administration's failure to fully cooperate with the Joint Committee and because its scope was limited to the Intelligence communities, the 9–11 families pushed for an independent commission. Legislation established the commission late last year.
Bush Ignoring Numerous Warnings
Among the first to sound the 9–11 impeachment siren were two veteran Democratic strategists. In June 2002, Bob Fertik and David Lytel launched "The Buck Stops Here" on their Democrats.com website. Similar to Homeland Security chief Tom Ridge's color-coded system of terrorists' alerts, Fertik and Lytel have compiled a devastating indictment of Bush, Cheney, Rice, and Rumsfeld.
That call for impeaching Bush asserts Bush allowed the September 11 terrorist attacks to succeed by ignoring numerous warnings, failing to take precautions against hijackings, and then lying about it afterwards. As of January 16, Democrats.com's electronic petition to impeach Bush had 4,774 "signatures."
Asked whether the site, home to progressive Democrats, had garnered any congressional support for impeachment, Fertik said, "Look at what happened to Cynthia McKinney. Nobody wants to be next," he said. Challenging the administration on 9–11 "is a guaranteed ticket to political hell."
Last spring, McKinney, a Democratic congresswoman from Georgia, called for an investigation of the events surrounding 9–11. McKinney said, "The American people deserve answers about what went wrong on September 11 and why."
She accused the administration of warmongering in Afghanistan and connected the role of oil and defense interests to U.S. policies. Although her statement seems prophetic now, McKinney was ridiculed at the time. Political strategists of her own party on national television derided her. Her reelection bid went up in smoke when she was defeated in the primary election.
Fertik called the "real juice" for investigating 9–11 the "People's Investigation and the 9–11 families who are pushing to have a commission. They are unhappy with the rigged commission. They want the truth."
Despite the administration's resistance to an independent commission to look into 9–11, Bush finally agreed. However, he appointed Henry Kissinger to head the commission. Kissinger, who has served in four Republican administrations, has a controversial reputation and oil interests in the Caspian Sea Basin.
Kissinger resigned and Bush appointed Thomas Kean, who also has oil interests conflicts and financial ties to bin Laden's brother-in-law.
Disappointed with the administration's response, a loose association of citizens, researchers, and activists is assembling a 9–11 Truth Alliance to establish its own investigation of the many unanswered questions surrounding 9–11. The alliance is organizing a 9–11 Citizens Truth Commission and planning a conference in New York City in the spring.
Fertik said there were a myriad of warnings about 9–11 "but whether Bush was personally privy has not been established."
That kind of information could be put on the table after hearings begin. Fertik pointed out that the Watergate hearings revealed Richard Nixon was tape recording his Oval office conversations and those tapes provided the proof of the cover-up of the illegal break-in at the Democratic National Headquarters and hush-funds payoffs.
The 9–11 Independent Commission, which has an 18-month legislative life, is unlikely to release its findings before the 2004 presidential election. "Yeah, that is part of their game plan," Fertik said. "They control the clock." He said Karl Rove, Bush's chief political strategist, "is brilliant at this. If they want something, it has to happen immediately, like the bombing of Iraq. Otherwise they will run out the clock."
"'Finality.' Remember that?" Fertik asked ruefully referring to the Republican tactics during the 2000 election recount. The Republicans argued the future of democracy depended on knowing who the next president would be, rather than on counting the votes.
"They will run this out, too," Fertik said.
Then, pausing, he offered: "Bob Graham is serious about running for president. He's furious at the White House and Bush and the intelligence community for jerking them (the Joint Intelligence Committee) around, and they kept secrets from the committee."
Fertik also said former committee co-chair Sen. Richard Shelby (R-Ala) is "equally livid. Maybe Graham will start talking about it if he runs, " mused Fertik.
Regardless of the scenario, Fertik maintained, "The American people have the right to know what went on and who to hold accountable."
The committee's 50-plus page staff report released in September listed dozens of warnings about attacks on U.S. soil including terrorists plans to use planes as weapons. (Excerpts from the committee report are below.)
CIA director George Tenet has refused to declassify a memo containing what he told Bush about terrorists' threats in an August 6, 2001, briefing. Graham has also expressed concerns about how the terrorists were able to enter and travel in the U.S.
Asked if the Bush administration's recalcitrance related to 9–11 might be a campaign issue in a 2004 Graham for President campaign, Carson Chandler in Graham's Senate office had this response: "That is something (Graham) has continually brought up regarding 9–11." However, Chandler said, until the senator decides his political future, "he is not talking about his agenda for a campaign."
Graham has said he will announce whether he is running for the Democratic nomination in 2004 in late January after Bush's state of the Union Address. News stories report Graham is busy talking with Florida supporters.
Activists have questioned what Graham and his House counterpart on the Intelligence Committee,, Rep. Porter Goss (R-Mich), were doing on the morning of 9–11 at a breakfast meeting with the Pakistan ISI chief Lt. General Mahmoud Ahmad. In October 2001, the Pakistan intelligence head was accused of wiring $100,000 to Mohammed Atta, the alleged mastermind of the 9–11 hijackers. Top officials in the Bush administration also met with Ahmad in the days before and after 9–11.
University of Illinois law professor Francis Boyle and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark have drafted articles of impeachment against Bush for his Iraqi war policies.
They wrote similar impeachment articles against George H.W. Bush for the Gulf War 12 years ago. Rep. Henry Gonzalez (D-Tx) introduced the articles of impeachment, which Boyle credits for halting Bush's march into Iraq.
More Questions About 9–11
Questioning the administration's handling of 9–11, several noted figures have recently broken the shroud of public silence about the administration's veracity and actions (or lack of) before, on, and after 9–11.
During a presentation to the Fairfax City Council in Marin County, California, which was considering a resolution to oppose the USA PATRIOT Act, Daniel Ellsberg, on January 7, raised the issue of what the administration knew.
"They were waiting for such an incident to come," Ellsberg said. He said as a Defense Department analyst in the 1970s, he would have been instructed to write such legislation under similar circumstances.
Following the council meeting, Ellsberg said, "They were warned there would be a major terrorist event. What did they do? Nothing. Bush was briefed in July and August. What did they do? I feel morally certain they drafted a Tonkin Gulf-like resolution for Afghanistan and polished up the PATRIOT Act before 9–11."
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave President Lyndon Johnson powers to drastically expand the U.S. war in Vietnam.
Ellsberg said he is not convinced "yet" Bush knew "precisely" when the events would happen. Afterwards, "they wanted to avoid blame. What government officials say after such events is almost never true. They always cover up afterwards."
Helen Thomas, a former UPI reporter and now a Hearst News columnist and dean of the White House Press Corps, is a lone voice among her colleagues in addressing 9–11. Upon release of the committee's final report and a call by Shelby for CIA director George Tenet to "take the fall," she asks if Bill Clinton and George W. Bush should be "held responsible" as well.
The corporate media has capitulated to fears of losing access to its news sources or approval of even more mergers and acquisition. The public broadcasting system fears losing its federal funding. Except for a few websites, even the independent media avoid reporting on 9–11 as if it were the worst of the 10 plagues.
Last fall, former Vice President Al Gore accused the administration of ignoring signs al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden planned to attack the United States on September 11. "The warnings were there before the attacks," he said. Gore also said Bush's Justice Department and the FBI had spent more time and money investigating a suspected New Orleans brothel than monitoring bin Laden and his terrorist network.
Yet, no U.S. government official has been held accountable. Instead, Bush has promoted and rewarded military and intelligence agency heads under whose watch 9–11 occurred. Members of Congress knew of the warnings and yet handed Bush, under whose watch 9–11 occurred, powers to invade Iraq.
Excerpts From Joint Inquiry Staff Statement of Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff, September 18, 2002
From the Foreward: "According to the DCI (Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet), the President's [sic] knowledge of intelligence information relevant to this Inquiry remains classified even when the substance of that intelligence information has been declassified. . . . (on two matters)
"The Joint Inquiry staff disagrees with the DCI's position on both issues. We believe the America public has a compelling interest in the information and that public disclosure would not harm national security. However, we do not have independent authority to declassify intelligence information short of a lengthy procedure in the U.S. Congress . . ."
The statement contained at least 11 references to terrorists using planes as weapons. Here are a few of those and other findings:
* "[S]hortly after Osama bin Laden's May 1998 press conference, the Intelligence Community began to acquire intelligence information indicating that bin Laden's network intended to strike inside the United States. Many of these reports were disseminated throughout the Intelligence Community and to senior U.S. policy makers."
* "In June 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information from several sources that Osama bin Laden was considering attacks in the U.S., including Washington, DC and New York. This information was provided to senior U.S. Government officials in July 1998." (Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part 1, 9–18–2002, pg. 15)
* "In August 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center. The information was passed to the FBI and the FAA. The FAA found the plot highly unlikely given the state of that foreign country's aviation program. Moreover, they believed that a flight originating outside the United States would be detected before it reached its intended target inside the United States. The FBI's New York office took no action on the information, filing the communication in the office 's bombing repository file . . .
* "In September 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that Osama bin Laden's next operation could possibly involve flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.S. airport and detonating it; this information was provided to senior U.S. Government officials in late 1998."
* "In the fall of 1998, the Intelligence Community received information concerning a bin Laden plot involving aircraft in the New York and Washington, DC areas."
* "In November 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that a bin Laden terrorist cell was attempting to recruit a group of five to seven young men from the United States to travel to the Middle East for training. This was in conjunction with planning to strike U.S. domestic targets . . ."
* "A December 1, 1998 Intelligence Community assessment of Osama bin Laden read in part: 'OBL is actively planning against U.S. targets . . . Multiple reports indicate UBL is keenly interested in striking the U.S. on its own soil . . . al-Qa'ida is recruiting operatives for attacks in the U.S. but has not yet identified potential targets.'"
* "A classified document signed by a senior U.S. Government official in December 1998 read in part: 'The intelligence community has strong indications that bin Laden intends to conduct or sponsor attacks inside the United States.'"
* "In the spring of 1999, the Intelligence Community obtained information about a planned bin Laden attack on a U.S. Government facility in Washington, D.C."
* "In the March of 2000, the Intelligence Community obtained information regarding the types of targets that operatives in bin Laden's network might strike. The Statue of Liberty was specifically mentioned, as were skyscrapers, ports, airports, and nuclear power plants."
* "A briefing prepared for senior government officials at the beginning of July 2001 contained the following language: 'Based on a review of all source reporting over the last five months, we believe that OBL will launch a significant terrorist attack against U.S. and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning.'"
* "[I]n August 2001, a closely held intelligence report, for senior government officials, included information that bin Laden had wanted to conduct attacks in the United States since 1997. The information included discussion of the arrest of Ahmed Ressam in December 1999, and the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. It mentioned that members of al Qaeda, including some U.S. citizens, had resided or traveled in or traveled to the United States for years, and that the group apparently maintained a support structure here. The report cited uncorroborated information obtained in 1998 that bin Laden wanted to hijack airplanes to gain the release of U.S.-held extremists. F.B.I. judgments about patterns of activity, consistent with preparation of hijackings . . ."
Copyright © 2003 Joyce Lynn
Joyce Lynn is a journalist and was a political reporter for eight years in Washington, DC. She is editor of the Political Diary. She can be reached at politicaldiary@hotmail.com.
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| The following is taken from the website of "The Age", Austrialia's equivalent of the New York Times. For those of you who have difficulty reading this sort of article (like most of my friends, as I learned last night), the key arguments have been bolded for clearer understanding.
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No, this war is illegal
Date: March 19 2003
By Hilary Charlesworth, Andrew Byrnes
The Prime Minister maintains that existing United Nations Security Council resolutions authorise the use of force against Iraq by the "coalition of the willing". He (and the legal advice he relies on) argues resolution 678 (November 29, 1990) provides continuing authorisation for such use of force without the need for a further, specific resolution. Such an interpretation of this and other resolutions concerning Iraq is untenable, since it contradicts their meaning and is inconsistent with the scheme of the UN charter and the context in which those resolutions were adopted.
Resolution 678 gave Iraq until January 15, 1991, to withdraw from Kuwait and, if that deadline was not met, authorised the use by UN members of all necessary means for the specific purpose of upholding earlier resolutions.
The specificity of the authorisation is made clear in paragraph two of resolution 678: member states must co-operate with the Government of Kuwait in any action to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.
Resolution 678 thus provided an enforcement mechanism for resolution 660 of August 2, 1990, adopted the day Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the subsequent reiterations of that resolution between August and November 1990. Resolution 660 made the determination required by the UN charter as a precondition for the collective use of force, that the invasion constituted a breach of international peace and security.
It could be argued that, were Iraq to re-invade Kuwait, the authorisation for UN members to use force in resolution 678 could be revived, although a more cautious view would be that resolution 678 is tied to a particular historical event, so a new resolution would be needed. In the absence of an invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, however, resolution 678 cannot be read as a standing authorisation for the use of force by a UN member against Iraq.
Resolution 678 thus clearly identified the invasion of Kuwait as the breach of international peace and security that triggered Security Council powers under the UN charter. It does not constitute a general power for the use of force.
Moreover, the terms of resolution 678 indicate the authorisation for the use of force is granted and monitored by the Security Council. It is inconsistent with the clear terms of resolution 678 and indeed the whole structure of the UN charter to argue one or more states could decide for themselves when and if the authorisation could be revived.
Some have argued a breach of the ceasefire agreement in resolution 687 entitles member states to use force. The position that individual member states can respond to claimed violations of the ceasefire agreement between Iraq and the UN without the consent of the Security Council is inconsistent with the role of the council and is an unsustainable view of international law.
Two further resolutions relied on to support the "continuing authorisation" theory are 687 and 1441. Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, set out the terms of the ceasefire. Section C deals with Iraq's obligations to destroy all weapons of mass destruction. But no provision of resolution 687 links Iraq's duty to destroy all weapons of mass destruction to the authorisation to use force set out in resolution 678. Indeed, the final paragraph of resolution 687 gives the Security Council the power to decide "such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area", implying further Security Council consideration will be needed.
Resolution 1441, of November 8, 2002, can be read as a further and more detailed response to Iraq's failure to satisfy the relevant authorities that it has fully complied with the obligation to destroy all weapons of mass destruction set out in resolution 687. It leaves open the issue of what will happen if Iraq does not comply with its terms, implying that the Security Council will need to consider the matter when further evidence appears.
Although, in standard Security Council style, all previous resolutions on Iraq are referred to in the preamble of resolution 1441, there is no paragraph that suggests UN member states may take "all necessary means" to implement the resolution.
Indeed, France, China and Russia made a public interpretative statement on resolution 1441 on the day it was adopted, noting they could vote for the resolution precisely because it contained no "automaticity" in the use of force. This understanding was confirmed in the United States's and Britain's formal explanation of their votes.
John Howard rightly points out there have been 17 Security Council resolutions dealing with Iraq since 1990. The number of resolutions in itself, however, does not change the plain wording of the text adopted by the Security Council and the statements by various members of the council that these resolutions have not authorised the further use of force.
The Prime Minister has assured the public that Australia will act consistently with international law in relation to Iraq. But the arguments he has identified to support his claim that a war on Iraq would be legal do not stand up to analysis.
Hilary Charlesworth and Andrew Byrnes are professors at the Centre for International and Public Law at the ANU.
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Resolution 678 does not do what America would like it: make this war completely legit in terms of international law. No longer is this a matter of the UN sleeping on the job during voting time because the US has still pulled the wool over their charter with the false and corrupted interpretation of their own resolution. Like California cannot make up Propositions that let it control federal issues in its own state (deemed unconstitutional), the U.S. cannot rewrite the UN charter to make it more convenient for themselves. The war is still illegal.
But if you still want to be for the war, then go ahead. After all, life's more comfortable amongst a sheepherd.
God bless America and their corrupt language.
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| The following article and pictures are taken from The Onion. Truly, and honorable source of news.
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WASHINGTON, DC—At a Pentagon press conference Monday, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld touted the military's upcoming Gulf War II: The Vengeance as "even better than the original."
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| Above: Donald Rumsfeld debriefs reporters on the upcoming Gulf War sequel, scheduled to hit Iraq March 22. |
"If you thought the first one was good, just wait until you see the sequel," Rumsfeld said of Gulf War II, scheduled to hit Iraqi theaters of operation March 22. "In the original, as you no doubt know, we defeat Saddam Hussein, only to let him slip away at the very end. This time, we're going back in to take out the trash."
Rumsfeld said the soon-to-be-unleashed war will feature special effects beyond anything seen in the original.
"Gulf War I was done 11 years ago, and war-making technology has advanced tremendously since then," Rumsfeld said. "From the guns to the planes to the missile-guidance systems, what you'll see in this one puts the original Gulf War to shame."
"The budget for Gulf War II: The Vengeance is somewhere in the neighborhood of $85 billion," Rumsfeld continued. "And every penny of it is up there on your screen."
Waged in 1991 at a cost of $61 billion, the first Gulf War was a major hit, making household names out of stars Colin Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf, and Wolf Blitzer. Asked who would star in the sequel, General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was coy.
"I don't want to give away too much, but let's just say you're likely to see a few familiar faces pop up," Myers said. "I will say that the son of one of the key characters in the first one, back then just a boy, is now all grown up and ready to take his rightful place at the head of the alliance."
Myers did confirm that the plot revolves around the Rebel forces' efforts to capture arch-nemesis Hussein, whom they believe is building a weapon of mass destruction somewhere deep within the mysterious and forbidding No-Fly Zone.
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| Above: A publicity still from Gulf War II. |
"Obviously, Saddam will be back," Myers said. "He's the perfect villain: ruthless, efficient, and sinister. It would be an affront to all the fans not to include him. Beyond that, what's going to happen is anybody's guess. One thing, though, is guaranteed: We're going to have more action, more danger, and definitely more kill power than the first time around."
"We've already started preliminary shooting," Myers said, "and so far, what we've got is unbelievable."
In addition to a major PR push, Gulf War II will be accompanied by a major merchandising campaign. Pentagon has secured the commitment of Topps for a series of cards supporting the effort. It has also brokered a first-look deal with CNN, guaranteeing the network full access to the front lines, as well as first crack at interviewing the men and women behind the scenes. The Pentagon has also signed Dan Rather to a two-cry deal.
In the 11 years since the original Gulf War, few conflicts have come close to matching the level of support and press attention generated by that operation.
"We were disappointed by our numbers in Bosnia," Rumsfeld said. "That particular conflict played primarily to an art-house crowd. Your mainstream audiences didn't connect with the complexities of the centuries-old ethnic clash you had going there. But this time, we feel we've got something very accessible that will play in Peoria. I mean, how can you go wrong with an 'Axis of Evil'?"
Though Gulf War II does not open fire for another two weeks, it has screened for select audiences in Los Angeles. Ain't It Cool News, the popular website run by Harry Knowles, recently leaked an advance review of the conflict.
"The battle sequences are even better than Black Hawk Down," Knowles wrote. "And Afghan leader Hamid Karzai, while only given a little action, exudes a Tarantino cool."
Pentagon officials, meanwhile, are already thinking about a third installment.
"There's no reason this Iraq thing can't be a franchise for us like those wars with Germany or the Communists used to be," Rumsfeld said. "The public loves it, the soldiers love it, the media love it. And even if the U.S. wins at the end of the second one, there are still plenty of possibilities for a third: Saddam could be destroyed, only to be replaced by an even greater evil. Then, of course, there's the prequel set in the Stone Age, the era we bomb Iraq back to at the end of the third one. As far as we're concerned, this thing is just getting started."
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| THE FOLLOWING TAKEN FROM THIS WEEK'S BBC NEWS AT BBCNEWS.CO.UK:
Cook's resignation speech
Cook received a standing ovation.
Here is the full text of Robin Cook's resignation speech in the House of Commons, which won applause from some backbenchers in unprecedented Commons scenes.
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This is the first time for 20 years that I have addressed the House from the back benches.
I must confess that I had forgotten how much better the view is from here.
None of those 20 years were more enjoyable or more rewarding than the past two, in which I have had the immense privilege of serving this House as Leader of the House, which were made all the more enjoyable, Mr Speaker, by the opportunity of working closely with you.
It was frequently the necessity for me as Leader of the House to talk my way out of accusations that a statement had been preceded by a press interview.
On this occasion I can say with complete confidence that no press interview has been given before this statement.
I have chosen to address the House first on why I cannot support a war without international agreement or domestic support.
Backing Blair
The present Prime Minister is the most successful leader of the Labour party in my lifetime.
I hope that he will continue to be the leader of our party, and I hope that he will continue to be successful. I have no sympathy with, and I will give no comfort to, those who want to use this crisis to displace him.
I applaud the heroic efforts that the prime minister has made in trying to secure a second resolution.
I do not think that anybody could have done better than the foreign secretary in working to get support for a second resolution within the Security Council.
But the very intensity of those attempts underlines how important it was to succeed.
Now that those attempts have failed, we cannot pretend that getting a second resolution was of no importance.
French intransigence?
France has been at the receiving end of bucket loads of commentary in recent days.
It is not France alone that wants more time for inspections. Germany wants more time for inspections; Russia wants more time for inspections; indeed, at no time have we signed up even the minimum necessary to carry a second resolution.
We delude ourselves if we think that the degree of international hostility is all the result of President Chirac.
The reality is that Britain is being asked to embark on a war without agreement in any of the international bodies of which we are a leading partner - not NATO, not the European Union and, now, not the Security Council.
To end up in such diplomatic weakness is a serious reverse.
Only a year ago, we and the United States were part of a coalition against terrorism that was wider and more diverse than I would ever have imagined possible.
'Heavy price'
History will be astonished at the diplomatic miscalculations that led so quickly to the disintegration of that powerful coalition.
The US can afford to go it alone, but Britain is not a superpower.
Our interests are best protected not by unilateral action but by multilateral agreement and a world order governed by rules.
Yet tonight the international partnerships most important to us are weakened: the European Union is divided; the Security Council is in stalemate.
Those are heavy casualties of a war in which a shot has yet to be fired.
I have heard some parallels between military action in these circumstances and the military action that we took in Kosovo. There was no doubt about the multilateral support that we had for the action that we took in Kosovo.
It was supported by NATO; it was supported by the European Union; it was supported by every single one of the seven neighbours in the region. France and Germany were our active allies.
It is precisely because we have none of that support in this case that it was all the more important to get agreement in the Security Council as the last hope of demonstrating international agreement.
Public doubts
The legal basis for our action in Kosovo was the need to respond to an urgent and compelling humanitarian crisis.
Our difficulty in getting support this time is that neither the international community nor the British public is persuaded that there is an urgent and compelling reason for this military action in Iraq.
The threshold for war should always be high.
None of us can predict the death toll of civilians from the forthcoming bombardment of Iraq, but the US warning of a bombing campaign that will "shock and awe" makes it likely that casualties will be numbered at least in the thousands.
I am confident that British servicemen and women will acquit themselves with professionalism and with courage. I hope that they all come back.
I hope that Saddam, even now, will quit Baghdad and avert war, but it is false to argue that only those who support war support our troops.
It is entirely legitimate to support our troops while seeking an alternative to the conflict that will put those troops at risk.
Nor is it fair to accuse those of us who want longer for inspections of not having an alternative strategy.
For four years as foreign secretary I was partly responsible for the western strategy of containment.
Over the past decade that strategy destroyed more weapons than in the Gulf war, dismantled Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and halted Saddam's medium and long-range missiles programmes.
Iraq's military strength is now less than half its size than at the time of the last Gulf war.
Threat questioned
Ironically, it is only because Iraq's military forces are so weak that we can even contemplate its invasion. Some advocates of conflict claim that Saddam's forces are so weak, so demoralised and so badly equipped that the war will be over in a few days.
We cannot base our military strategy on the assumption that Saddam is weak and at the same time justify pre-emptive action on the claim that he is a threat.
Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction in the commonly understood sense of the term - namely a credible device capable of being delivered against a strategic city target.
It probably still has biological toxins and battlefield chemical munitions, but it has had them since the 1980s when US companies sold Saddam anthrax agents and the then British Government approved chemical and munitions factories.
Why is it now so urgent that we should take military action to disarm a military capacity that has been there for 20 years, and which we helped to create?
Why is it necessary to resort to war this week, while Saddam's ambition to complete his weapons programme is blocked by the presence of UN inspectors?
Israeli breaches
Only a couple of weeks ago, Hans Blix told the Security Council that the key remaining disarmament tasks could be completed within months.
I have heard it said that Iraq has had not months but 12 years in which to complete disarmament, and that our patience is exhausted.
Yet it is more than 30 years since resolution 242 called on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories.
We do not express the same impatience with the persistent refusal of Israel to comply.
I welcome the strong personal commitment that the prime minister has given to middle east peace, but Britain's positive role in the middle east does not redress the strong sense of injustice throughout the Muslim world at what it sees as one rule for the allies of the US and another rule for the rest.
Nor is our credibility helped by the appearance that our partners in Washington are less interested in disarmament than they are in regime change in Iraq.
That explains why any evidence that inspections may be showing progress is greeted in Washington not with satisfaction but with consternation: it reduces the case for war.
Presidential differences
What has come to trouble me most over past weeks is the suspicion that if the hanging chads in Florida had gone the other way and Al Gore had been elected, we would not now be about to commit British troops.
The longer that I have served in this place, the greater the respect I have for the good sense and collective wisdom of the British people.
On Iraq, I believe that the prevailing mood of the British people is sound. They do not doubt that Saddam is a brutal dictator, but they are not persuaded that he is a clear and present danger to Britain.
They want inspections to be given a chance, and they suspect that they are being pushed too quickly into conflict by a US Administration with an agenda of its own.
Above all, they are uneasy at Britain going out on a limb on a military adventure without a broader international coalition and against the hostility of many of our traditional allies.
From the start of the present crisis, I have insisted, as Leader of the House, on the right of this place to vote on whether Britain should go to war.
It has been a favourite theme of commentators that this House no longer occupies a central role in British politics.
Nothing could better demonstrate that they are wrong than for this House to stop the commitment of troops in a war that has neither international agreement nor domestic support.
I intend to join those tomorrow night who will vote against military action now. It is for that reason, and for that reason alone, and with a heavy heart, that I resign from the government.
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If you are yet unconvinced that this war is unneccessary, I pity you.
It's not a matter of how easy it would be to blow up Iraq, it's a matter of its futility and the futility of countless casualties when there need only be one: that of Saddam's.
Alot of people really believe that the U.S. has done everything they can to stop Saddam: Can this be so, or is our idiot of a President impatient and ready and willing to pick up where Daddy Bush left off?
COME ON AMERICA! WHO DIDN'T SEE THIS COMING?!
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This is News!
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I'm typing...that new! Therefore, it is news.
Why can't the media be more like this???
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